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PRE-TRIAL: AID TO THE NEW ADVOCACY*
MELVIN M. BELLIt
Justice Murrah and you have honored me, a trial lawyer, or advocate,
if you will, by your invitation to negate "the complaint among some, that
pre-trial is destroying the art of advocacy." I was urged, in your most,
and usual, graceful and respectful judicial manner, that I "must adhere,
in the interest of time and the importance of this subject, to this specific
phase of pre-trial." Justice Murrah admonished, "We should not forget
that the purpose of the pre-trial is to strip the lawsuit to its bare factual
and legal bones."
At the outset, may I pause to say I am happy to note that Justice
Murrah subscribes to this expression "pick the bones clean." I had
thought, heretofore, that admonition was currently being reserved for
insurance companies' stockholders' reports in reference to their corporate
bones when treated by my Adequate Award!
I think you would know that I must favor an adequate pre-trial as
much as I do the Adequate Award, for the definition of the adequate
award is "fair," "just," "equitable," and "realistic" compensation (it is
not, as some slander us, the "excessive" award), and compensation is not
"fair," "just," "equitable," and "realistic," unless it is speedy compensa-
tion, a verdict or a settlement, or an award after appeal, returned some-
where in point of time to the date of the injury. A two hundred thousand
dollar personal injury award for a bilateral extremities amputation after
a trial five years from the event of trauma, couldn't be an adequate or
just award. Time has destroyed the money yardstick.
So if you hold out promise to me, and what's more important to all
of us, to our clients, the laymen, of just awards more speedily achieved,
of a procedure helping to unclog our calendars, I, as a trial lawyer and
advocate, vote officially for it.
I come directly to the precise subject assigned me. I quote from my
book, Trial and Tort Trends of 1956:
Pre-trial has been the bastard of the law. More than that, it has been a
premature bastard. However, I predict that like the bastard turned genius,
its paternity will be claimed by many within the next several years ....
It is heralded by some as the "end of advocacy," since everything must be
"thrashed out" and not only no surprises left for trial, but practically no
trial lef t.... I have seen and been a party to the most rigorous pre-trial
in many states. Unfortunately, its procedures vary state to state. Partic-
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ularly in Detroit [Michigan] where pre-trial originated, have I tried
cases, and certainly there is no "end to advocacy" in that jurisdiction. On
the other hand, if pre-trial operates as intended, advocacy can bloom as
never before, and counsel will then deploy his talents to the major aspects
of the lawsuit remaining undetermined and not to obfuscating details.
What is This Advocacy?
But, first, let us determine what is this advocacy? Then let us discuss
really whether you judges and justices want to preserve it, or do you in-
tend insidiously to make inroads upon it by pre-trial and some in camera
sessions, then slip into an autocratic or a workman's compensation sys-
tem which would completely abandon trial by jury and advocacy.
To begin our discussion, let us examine some of the canards cur-
rently being culled by the layman, the magazines, and the press, for
our mistress, Modern Trial Law. Deserved or undeserved?
Several years ago, after attending a number of local and national bar
association conventions, I came to the conclusion that the forgotten man
at a bar association convention was him for whom we exist, if we are
true to our profession, "our client"! We discussed our fees, our social
events, our prestiges, our election of officers (which latter event never
seems to take much time or entail vigorous contest since this is rather
a cut and dried affair), and the place of our next convention. Very, very
little was said for, of, or about the layman, the client. Indeed, personal
injury law, which today is 75% of all trial law, was as deliberately
avoided for a discussion topic as would be condylomata acuminata at the
regular Thursday meeting of the ladies club. Recently, there has been a
healthy change to consider some of these things that very importantly
affect the layman and incidentally give us our only excuse for existence-
his welfare, his rehabilitation, his personal injuries.
Perhaps we began to see the handwriting on the wall, as well as in
the public press. The layman is getting pretty well fed up with us.
First, there were the clogged court calendars of four and five years.
Then, the costs of litigation, the two and three years' delay on appeal.
Personal injury lawyers began to ask questions, dnd the layman began
to ask questions. Pre-trial is one result of the questions asked by the
layman and by the advocate himself. Now we are to determine, typically
enough, will it end advocacy? I believe our first inquiry should be, is
it good for the layman? Our second inquiry, will it end advocacy?
Fortunately, if you accept my definition of advocacy, the courses are
synonymous.
I am particularly pleased to speak to you as a trial lawyer and, al-
though I spend considerable time lecturing and writing, I hope, a practi-
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cal trial lawyer. I've not had an easy nor gracious time disseminating
my ideas, but as I went about this country, I found very few judges
who would not listen to me, who would not hear out my procedures of
modern trials and demonstrative evidence, even though they did not at
first agree with me, provided I met them half-way and preliminarily ex-
plained the relevance of each proper procedure.
Bar Associations Critical
Unfortunately, a number of bar associations were most critical, even
before listening, and their criticism was not constructive, either for me,
my brothers at the trial bar, the modern law, or the layman, him whom
we must all consider, whether we be lawyer or judge. Some bar as-
sociations considered that the profession of law was created solely to
perpetuate the profession, for the benefit it would bring to its members,
rather than to be the servant of the lay person, the client, the citizenry.
They considered themselves the principals, the clients, their causes, the
incidentals.
Unfortunately, some trial lawyers, and on the personal injury side,
acted likewise. I recall the story told of the southern lawyer with the
reputation for charging high fees. Came to his office one day a new
client, who expressed, upon the initial meeting, trepidation as to the size
of this lawyer's fees were he to represent him in his personal injury case.
Said this opulent, forensic battler of the south: "My friend, what you've
heard about me and us lawyers is entirely untrue. To prove it to you,
I'm not going to charge you one single cent as a fee for representing you
-as a matter of fact, to prove to you how generous we lawyers really
are, I'm going to give you half of everything we collect from your law-
suit !"
I should say, at the outset, I've not had the pleasure of trying a case
against any of you, that is, when you were advocates before your ascend-
ing the Bench. I do recall, however, there is one of you who did oppose
me on my first case after I had passed the bar; it was after California
had adopted its "corfmenting on the evidence" statute and this lawyer,
who was the then District Attorney of a county near mine in San Fran-
cisco, offered a comment on the evidence to the trial court that poor
Louie, my defendant, had bought the poison for domestic purposes
other than killing the rats about the house.
My client and I felt very bad when he was hanged, although his
grief was shorter-lived than mine. I was particularly chagrined when
this District Attorney subsequently introduced me at political gatherings
as "the next speaker, a young graduate from the University of California,
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who, when the trap was sprung at San Quentin last Friday, had half his
practice wiped out!"
Well, the case was People v. Gosden, in 6 Cal. 2d 14 (1936), and
the District Attorney went along to achieve a fair amount of success
in the law profession-he is our honorable Chief Justice Earl Warren
The only moral I can give you to this case is to say: "Just look at him
now, he hasn't got a single client to his name!"
Since my name has so frequently been coupled with a phrase of legal
modernity, "The Adequate Award," at the outset I say that I shall not
attempt to infuse this subject into the discussion (only indirectly) today.
Chancellor Kent gave us a yardstick which we still employ in construct-
ing the adequate judicial edifice. He said if the verdict is the result of
"passion and prejudice," the product of an "inflamed mind," it is ex-
cessive. Indeed, one jurist commented that the verdict must strike a
reasonably prudent person at first flush as "outrageous."
To define "advocacy," in an address, "The Modern Trial Lawyer,"
that I made last fall before the International Academy of Trial Lawyers
in New York, I tried to determine a definition of what is Law. And I
first dutifully reported Joseph Choate's pontification, "Law is the ex-
pression and perfection of common sense." Of course, I did that because
in all lawyers' speeches somewhere along the line, Abraham Lincoln,
Blackstone, or Joseph Choate is worked in for a sort of converse self-
serving "guilt by association" accolade. I discarded the Great Ones'
definition for the statement, ironically enough, of one dishonored in his
respect for the law, Aaron Burr. "Law is whatever is boldly asserted
and plausibly maintained," he said. I like this definition better than
any I've seen because it takes the straight-jacket from the common law.
While giving law its essential objectivity, such definition, too, gives it
the probabilities of vigorous growth, of malleability to modernity. But
more than this, it gives us as an integral part of our definition the aware-
ness of them who we all are, lawyers. Without the lawyer there could
be no law for it is his function, his profession, nay, his duty "boldly to
assert and plausibly to maintain."
Necessity of the Lawyers
In the political arena, the late Senator Joseph McCarthy said: "We
don't need lawyers or defenses, we know who are the malefactors!"
But, actually, do we, politically, any more than in our civil courts,
without advocacy, know what is the adequate award, or in the criminal
court, the adequate punishment, unless both sides, respectively, boldly
assert and plausibly maintain?
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I recall the story of an old Irish judge, who came upon the bench one
irate morning (I mix the figure deliberately because, though I could give
horrendous examples to the contrary, only an Irishman really can know
what is an "irate morning"-and particularly after a delightful "night
before"): "I find for the defendant!" abruptly announced his Lordship,
without having heard a word from plaintiff's counsel.
"But my Lord--" began plaintiff's counsel. Whereupon, his Lord-
ship said: "Fifteen minutes' argument then-no more."
Plaintiff's counsel argued valiantly, commandingly, so convincingly
that when he concluded, and as defendant's counsel arose, as a matter of
course, to reply, his Lordship barked: "Just a minute-I made up my
mind once, before coming here this morning. After hearing plaintiff's
argument, I've changed my decision and find for him. Now I don't
want you to argue and make me change my mind again-what would
these lay people, your clients, think this law is, black one minute, white
the next?"
So it is important that we understand what is advocacy before we de-
termine whether we must maintain it or discard it. If pre-trial is inimical
to its perpetuation, pre-trial, not advocacy, must go. Therefore, I give
you another concept of advocacy: "The sparks of conflict shed the light
by which justice may be seen!"
Now we're probing very close to the vena cava of our profession. But
most importantly, we are talking about something our clients can under-
stand, something for which they criticize us most severely: One advocate
before a jury maintains the speed was sixty miles an hour. His friend
for the defense, as plausibly and as vigorously, asserts that it was thirty.
It is the advocate's duty to put his best foot forward, to paint his best
picture for his client.
You are familiar with the famous English cases in which it was
asked, "May an advocate defend a guilty?" The answer was, "not only
may he, but must he."
The further question: "may an advocate defend a man he knows to
be, and who has told him he is guilty?" The answer still is "yes," he must
do everything he can for him, within the law. No man who lives with
heart and soul so black, but that something cannot be said for him,
by another human being, let alone an advocate.
However, knowing him to be guilty, must the advocate, both in Eng-
land and this country, not say either in his statement of fact or as his
deceitful opinion, "this man is innocent." (The nice distinction is set
forth in People v. Dykes, 107 Cal. App. 107 (1930). Counsel, in stating
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his opinion, in advocacy, to a jury, must say, "based upon the evidence,"
and in fact, his opinion must be based upon the evidence.)
The dictionary defines "advocacy" as pleading for or supporting, and
an "advocate" as one who "defends" or "recommends publicly." So,
again we see that our definition of Aaron Burr's "boldly asserting and
plausibly maintaining" is the function of advocacy.
In preparing myself to talk to you, I looked again into Lloyd Paul
Stryker's The Art of Advocacy, A Plea for the Renaissance of the
Trial Lawyer. I looked at Justice Medina's introduction and I agree
with his statement, "Increasingly over the years the 'orator' or spell-
binder has gradually been going out of fashion."
Demonstrative Evidence
In some of our minds, there has been the feeling that the advocate or
advocacy must of essence be dramatic or oratorical. But such is the
same misconception with many of the phases of the Adequate Award
and demonstrative evidence of which I have spoken and written so
much these last recent years. I urge not demonstrative evidence for
drama, nor blatant spectacle. Had I chosen that, I would have elected
another forum. I urge these only for their relevancy, their necessity.
A picture is not "gruesome," the exhibition of an amputated limb is not
"grisly." Profferance into evidence of colored motion pictures is not
"dramatic," they are admissible, if admissible, for one purpose alone:
they must be relevant, they must be of probative value. Whether they
are "grisly," "dramatic," "unwholesome" or "horrendous," is completely,
utterly irrelevant.
Justice Medina ends his introduction to Lloyd Stryker's Art of Ad-
vocacy with the lofty statement: "When once the spark is fired and a
young lawyer becomes thoroughly imbued with the grim determination
to see that justice is done as between man and man, and as between man
and the state, there is a reasonable basis for hope that this young man
will dedicate himself to the cause of justice, as every lawyer should."
But I fear that some of you make such statements without fully ap-
preciating that in order "to do justice, man between man," there must
be the art of advocacy and the unbridled right of the advocate or lawyer
boldly to assert and plausibly to maintain.
If you circumvent this right by cutting off the advocate in his opening
statement, in his argument to you or to the jury, by "commenting on
the evidence," by substituting your judgment for that of the advocate
on pre-trial, by hurried consultation, then you do not permit justice
to be done in advocacy.
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I hope that I am not presumptuous in reminding you that especially
important in these days of fear and hysteria and the need for lawyers
who will courageously undertake an unpopular defense in pillor rather
than praise, is the duty as well as the right of advocacy.
I am particularly privileged to speak to you because I sincerely believe
in this art of advocacy, the necessity of the lawyer who is the profes-
sional advocate, to maintain in our way of life, whether in the political
arena, the civil cause, in the Supreme Court of the United States, or
in the police courts of the thousands of our halls of justice. I would
bitterly denounce any procedure or institution which surreptitiously or
directly infringed advocacy or the forum in which it is practiced.
Now we have defined "advocacy." We see it is a somewhat different
concept from the layman's understanding.
The Forum of the Modern Advocate
Now we are to determine that the modern forum of the advocate is not
alone the courtroom, that it may be in chambers in pre-trial, provided-
and this is an important provision-the litigant, both civilly and crimi-
nally, eventually has the right and access to trial by jury upon all
factual issues, if dissatisfied. Particularly should this be true in the
federal court, historically, the "people's court" (I use the word "people"
in its anti-revolutionary, that is American Revolutionary, sense).
Likewise, the modem judge may be and act as a judge whether on
the bench, in court trial, or before a jury, or in chambers on pre-trial.
He may preserve advocacy in all three instances. He may just as well
destroy it in any of the three, i.e., by brutal evidentiary comments before
a jury, by arrogant conduct in trial by court, by informal, caustic and
uncalled for remarks in chambers on pre-trial.
The ancient institution of the "court" is the judge, whether sitting or
traveling, in his own jurisdiction, or elsewhere. A wife is a wife, whether
at home, in the bosom of her family, with her husband, or socially
away from home, when her husband is not present. She may demean
herself in conduct the antithesis of wifely virtue. So may the judge
demean himself in the freedom and informality of pre-trial compared to
the formal courtroom.
Even he who secretly fancies himself the greatest of modern trial
lawyers, and therefore, lacking humility, is probably the least, should
be satisfied that pre-trial gives him even greater opportunity to ply his
art. In the specialty of surgery, the patient is wheeled into the operating
room. She has been preliminarily sedated, she's been scrubbed and
sterilized, she has been draped, the instruments are set out, she has been
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surgically "pre-trialed," both in the doctor's office and the hospital. Only
then does the surgeon begin his actual surgery. That operation will not
start until this patient is thoroughly prepared because, other things
being equal, a good operation is a fast operation.
Could it be said that because there is more and detailed preparation
and research and investigation preoperatively in surgery today that the
specialty of actual surgery itself is being abolished? To the contraryl
The skill of the surgeon is truly greater now than ever before. It should
be no different with the modern trial: busy jurors should not be kept
waiting to watch the laborious, and sometimes distasteful "scrubbing"
and "preparing" that can go on interminably in the court in the case that
hasn't been pre-trialed. Not only is our modern jurors' time too valuable,
but they will lose sight of the important points in the case if there is too
much irrelevant preparatory detail. True advocacy compounds analysis,
terseness; it does not include delay and confounding.
Of course, that preparation in the pre-trial must be as meticulous and
as searching and as exhaustive as the preoperative preparation of re-
searching and X-raying, case history, diagnosing, studying, sedating,
scrubbing and draping in surgery, or, no matter how adept or clever the
surgeon, the whole operation, as the trial, will go awry and become in-
fected with irrelevant contaminants for lack of proper preparation.
A little bit of pre-trial in a given case can be as useless, nay as
dangerous, as a little bit of asepsis before surgery!
The layman resents the haggling by counsel over the introduction of
an exhibit, whether it's a glossy print or a dull print, whether it's a large
picture or a small picture, whether it's "inflammatory" or "prejudicial,"
whether it's a distortion, whether it's relevant. Whole mornings may be
spent in such bickering while the jurors restlessly watch the clock. Cer-
tainly, it is not the abolition of advocacy to determine whether this pic-
ture, this exhibit, should or should not be admissible beforehand.
In the field of demonstrative evidence, I have found rare instances
in which my exhibits of models, mock-ups, aerial photos, colored pic-
tures, motion pictures, sound motion pictures, news shots, physical ob-
jects, were refused admission into evidence, because in every case, I had
apprised the trial judge before trial of my precise proof and submitted
the points and authorities. This has been done in jurisdictions where
there were no pre-trials. Certainly, it did not deter my advocacy with
demonstrative evidence, that, on trial, I could go directly to the exhibits
without having to haggle, discuss and argue them before the jury. With
pre-trial, the profferance and ruling upon these exhibits does no more than
put into effect what I had advocated in my lectures on the use of demon-
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strative evidence, i.e., that all of these should be explored beforehand.
Surprise today in our courts rarely is an element of advocacy.
I have used the expression: "the trial of the modern lawsuit is a race
of disclosure." I have said that today's trial is the explanation and por-
trayal and use of everything in counsel's briefcase as fast as he can
get it out and before the jury. With our modern discovery procedures,
the respective sides know what the other party has. If they do not, they
are derelict and should know. Cannot rulings be made upon the ad-
missibility and the availability of these various bits of evidence known
to both sides before trial in formal pre-trial orders?
I recently tried a medical malpractice death case in Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania, presided over by able Federal District Judge Rabe Marsh, Jr.
We had a thorough pre-trial, at which both sides were asked to disclose
the names of their witnesses, the names of all of their witnesses, both lay
and medical, to display all exhibits, all of the procedures to be used.
While I was trying this case, I saw what happened to a lawyer in an
adjoining court who had failed to disclose the name of one of his medical
witnesses: this lawyer's case was on trial into its second week when he
called a medical witness whose name had not been disclosed at pre-trial.
As soon as this medical witness was seated in the witness chair, defend-
ant's counsel asked for a mistrial, and it was granted. The judge's reason-
ing: "I cannot allow this doctor to testify because under pre-trial rules
his name was not divulged when it was requested. But I must go further
than this, since, though not allowing him to testify, the jury has seen him
take the oath and go to the stand. They may feel that, being called, he
had important testimony for plaintiff, which he was not allowed to give
since he was recalled. Therefore, the only way to remedy this wrong
will be to start the trial all over again"!
Malpractice
Advocacy today is at its most distorted concept in the medical mal-
practice case. Every judge here knows of the ancient medical therapy
still being modernly applied: the conspiracy of silence! Every judge
here, at least off the record, knows of the truth of George Bernard Shaw's
words about the medical profession: "We are not a profession, we're a
conspiracy."
I do not mean to offend by discussing "The Doctor's Dilemma" today.
I ask, though, recognizing the hypothesis of this conspiracy of silence,
what can pre-trial do in this type of case not to abolish advocacy but
to restore it? In the face of condoned perjury, there can be no true
advocacy for one cannot vigorously and plausibly assert (our definition).
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The facts are as shifting sand, the foundation as undependable. So
advocacy in the malpractice case is generally not that at all: it's a play,
generally a tragedy. It's a distortion of justice, a reflection of hypocrisy
in our courts.
I have noted, however, that while there are fewer medical malpractice
cases federal-wise, the federal judge scrutinizes the problem of medical
testimony more carefully than the state judge does.
And the layman is becoming soundly disgusted with the doctor who
refuses to testify against his brother doctors. He is also disgusted with
the doctor testifying for the other doctor, and the lawyer as well, on both
sides, the judge and the law that countenances such a tragedy in the
courtroom.
What can pre-trial do to restore advocacy in the medical malpractice
case? Should the trial judge be more vigorous to assert himself in one
type of case than another? I do believe if ever there were opportunity
for firm judicial hands in pre-trial, it should be in the medical mal-
practice case. I hope to see some pre-trial judge enter an order based
upon his own ferreting of the facts or calling expert medical witnesses
of his own motion in pre-trial in this type of lawsuit!
At least the medical pre-trial should obviate one gross injustice that
mocks advocacy in the malpractice case. I noticed recently in several
jurisdictions, widely separated, that when a community doctor is on trial
for malpractice, the wives of the various doctors of the community flock
to the courtroom to take prominent seats where they can fawn on and
smile at members of the jury. But more than this, medical witnesses are
called by the defense not because of proficiency in the particular subject,
but because of their having patients on the particular jury! At least,
on pre-trial, rules can be made with reference to doctor-witness dis-
closure, so that later in court the advocates will not be practicing before
a stacked house.
SETTLEMNTS
The goal of all lawsuits must be disposition of the controversy and
as soon as possible. There should be no advocacy for advocacy's sake
alone anymore than should there be an unnecessary or a prolonged surgi-
cal procedure.
Ideally, there would be no lawsuits for there would be no contro-
versies, there would be no lawyers, there could be no advocacy. But
we know that as we are human beings, as long as we have a society as
we know it, and as we like it, there will be advocacy or the plausible
maintaining of adverse interests on the local, the national and unfortu-
nately, on the international level, although on the international level,
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what we are inventing (and not in the courts or the legislatures) both
here and abroad, may end international advocacy for all of us in a ball
of white smoke!
It is the advocate's duty to settle a lawsuit without taking his client
to court, just as much as it is the doctor's duty to heal, when possible,
by medicine rather than by scalpel. The latter, like the lawsuit, is not
only more painful, more expensive, but it takes longer to recover there-
from.
But if we settle all our lawsuits, then don't we end advocacy? Not at
all. I settle twenty-five out of twenty-six of my cases and still I am in
court almost every day of the year (except, of course, when I'm on the
sawdust trail preaching the adequate award and demonstrative evidence).
But I have to maintain my advocacy in court on trial in order to keep
up my settlement value. Let me lose two in a row, and the value for a
case in current negotiations drops precipitously. Let me go into a low
verdict center and be successful in achieving an adequate award and im-
mediately, the value of cases, both on settlement and on trial, rises. This
pronouncedly happened in Mississippi and, last summer, most dra-
matically, in Montana, where we tried a case resulting in a verdict of
$183,000. The highest verdict theretofore in Anaconda, Montana had
been $30,000. Immediately after judgment, upon the verdict being
entered for $183,000, settlement demands went up all over that state,
doubled and trebled, and what's more important, were recognized as
being fair, values having lagged theretofore, utterly inadequate. Fur-
thermore, these demands were paid. This is not a hearsay statement.
This is a report to you based upon some two dozen letters from judges
and lawyers throughout Montana.
I discuss settlements with you, because, though not accomplished
actually in the courtroom, they, like pre-trial, demand the highest type
of advocacy. The modern client is no longer as interested in his lawyer's
gestures, sartorial raiment, elocution, histrionics, and forensic flourishes
as he is with his advocate's ability practically and materially to answer
his question: "How much and how soon for me and my family"? The
average American, fortunately or unfortunately, has learned to expect
succor from the nursing bottle to the streamlined hearse. Quite naturally,
therefore, he has little sympathy for an advocacy of form rather than
substance.
But the highest skill must necessarily be employed not only by both
counsel, but by the trial judge to achieve an adequate settlement in pre-
trial. It is not necessary for a judge to be on the bench, or to litigate
before a jury in the jury box, for an advocate to practice the art of ad-
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vocacy. It can be done in the judge's chambers in pre-trial. I hope I
never have confused advocacy with histrionics or forensic drama.
Brochure
Do not forget that Perry Nichols, of Miami, Florida, and I originated
the "brochure method of trial." Indeed, I have a chapter on this in my
Modern Trials. This "brochure method" is nothing more than an in-
formal, unilateral "pre-trial" whereby I take every fact on liability,
every element of damage, every researchable point of law, put these into
a book along with my realistic demand for relief, and present it to the
defendant or the insurance company. I say: "This is our case. We are
making a demand which you may think is for a lot of money, but we
can back it up. Here it is. We are not hiding anything, in fact, you may
think there's some 'gimmick' because we make this disclosure to you
(and indeed, some defendants at first suspiciously so treated our bro-
chure method of 'trial')."
I felt and feel that such brochure system of trial or settlement is ad-
vocacy at the highest level, although we're trying to avoid the courtroom
instead of urging it. If plaintiff's counsel would come to pre-trial with his
"brochure" having been served on defendant, not only could issues be
narrowed but possible settlement achieved.
I feel it is unnecessary to have a "settlement calendar" separate from
a "pre-trial calendar." Pre-trial can accomplish its purposes as well as
determining whether there is the possibility of settlement. Of course,
there is always the value of a third person, the judge, giving -the ad-
vocates as many chances as possible to settle by calling them together
on more than one occasion.
I believe that settlement advocacy requires just as much or even greater
skill than a courtroom advocacy because one must still be, and let us
be frank about it, a "horse trader" in settlement. But he must clearly
distinguish between statements of opinion and statements of fact. One
may not misrepresent facts of liability or damage to opposing counsel in
attempting settlement. Otherwise, after a settlement is negotiated, if
defense counsel or an insurance company learns of your deceit, you will
and should be marked forevermore in future settlements. A settlement
is not a singular one-day thing. It is part of one's reputation, practice,
part of your future procedure to be judged by.
In every personal injury case, it is part of an advocate's duty to dis-
cuss settlement before bringing it to pre-trial, and indeed, in most of the
cases, if there is not an actual, outright demand and offer, both counsel
know pretty well what the other will do. Consequently, I believe it to
1957] PRE-TRIAL
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
be the pre-trial judge's function not to state his opinion of the value of
the lawsuit, unless expressly asked so to do by both counsel. This does
not mean that he should not inquire "Have you discussed settlement"
and even go further by saying, "What is your demand, What is your
offer, Do you think you can get together, Are there facts presently un-
disclosed that if they were made available, would assist settlement?"
Such procedure allows advocacy on the part of both counsel and
judicial demeanor upon the part of the judge. But some judges destroy
advocacy, take the case away from both counsel when, without being
asked, they state, brusquely and arbitrarily, their opinion in value of the
case, of which they cannot be as familiar as the lawyers who have pre-
pared it and brought it up to pre-trial. Recently, in Los Angeles, in a
federal court pre-trial, there had been a $15,000 offer of settlement
against a $25,000 demand. Without becoming fully or at all ac-
quainted with the facts of the lawsuit, and only on a superficial perusal
of the file, the pre-trial judge, hearing there was this $15,000 offer,
and without even waiting to hear the demand, said: "$15,000 is high.
I'd take it and run." Well, we didn't have the opportunity to "take it
and run" (even if we had been so inclined), for defendant dropped his
offer, upon this judge's comments, to $12,500.
But, as said by the King, in "The King and I," "It is a puzzlement"
when we check our statistics, at least in our office, and come up with
figures showing that in 85% of our cases tried after offer, the jury verdict
is higher than the settlement offer. Throughout the country I know that
the plaintiff tries his worst cases and settles his best ones. He'd like to
settle his worst ones, but insurance companies will not let him. And
frequently, plaintiff's lawyers are forced to try cases that never should
have been taken in the first place. This really is what is clogging our
trial calendars today! These are the so-called "stinker cases" which
are kicked over week after week. Plaintiff postpones the inevitable day
of trial, but eventually has to go out, and in half of them, settles for what
he can get "on the courthouse steps." But he has taken time and energy
and advocacy from his deserving cases, he has taken the court's time,
and the insurance company adds up its litigation costs in its premium
statistics.
Now you may well say, in the example given above, that if $15,000
looked "high" to that trial judge on pre-trial, as a part of his judicial act
of judging, he should so speak out so that an "injustice" would not be
done to the defendant insurance carrier in paying too much money. And
I am afraid some of you not only so think, but so act. For those of you
who do, we've -neither the time nor the right of subject nor forum to
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dissuade you, since, may I remind you, and me, that my topic is preserva-
tion of advocacy in pre-trial. If you are sincere and you want to pre-
serve advocacy in pre-trial, if you are not using it actually to by-pass
the right to jury trial, to usurp arbitrary functions and clothe yourselves
by means of the informality of a mandatory pre-trial with rights you
would not dare exercise publicly in open court, then you would not make
such a statement as that judge did, nor act in comparable manner.
Just as long as you realize what you do if you so act, then I've made
my point that you are not concerned with preserving advocacy, and
under those circumstances I would eschew pre-trial.
New York Rule 4
The other night I had dinner with the Metropolitan Trial Lawyers
Association in New York. I heard them express their feelings concerning
Rule 4 of the appellate division, which purports to regulate lawyers'
fees in personal injury matters. And I thought, here, if this rule is main-
tained and similar judicial or statutory legislation spreads through the
country, will that be the end of advocacy, for should we not have learned
long since past, that honesty and integrity cannot be legislated into a
lawyer anymore than can ability.
It is not in pre-trial that we see the end of advocacy. It is in such
regulations. For if we regulate the lawyers' fees based on the assumption
that he is unethical and dishonest and morally unequipped to deal
properly with his client, then must we regulate every other phase of his
activities: we must scrutinize the facts upon which he argues his case
and make him file an affidavit that his argument is based upon facts
before it be given, we must regulate precisely the length of time of his
opening statement, his closing argument. We must zealously scrutinize
his cross-examination and his direct examination, and, indeed, as has
been suggested and is done in New York, how his client comes to him
and the disbursal sheet which he files at the end of the case.
Impartial Medical
Then there is the impartial medical witness proffered to the layman
as the ultimate arbitrator of justice in New York. It is he, not pre-trial,
who ends advocacy. It is he who is offered as being able to answer
objectively the age-old questions, "What happened to my body, How
long will the wounds last, Will I get well, Is my injury permanent"?
As long as there is trial by jury, no federal judge, no judge in this
country would turn to a jury and say, "I dismiss you, you are through,
I am going to answer these questions myself." But, in effect, law does
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this with the so-called impartial medical witness for that witness, clothed
with the court's dignity of choice, pontificates the answer to the final
medical question of prognosis.
Dr. Adams
It had been reported at one stage of our history, before a good Re-
publican party and a good Democratic party attempted to solve it all,
that "What this country needed was a good five cent cigar"! But for a
long time, it has been known what ailing England really needed: a pana-
ceum much more grisly than proffered to us: a good murder!
It wasn't taxes, it wasn't the dissolution of the Empire, it wasn't any
supposed marital defection of the Prince Consort. It was just that a
real, down-to-earth poisoner such as Crippen hadn't forensically recently
been mixing his phials, that a Jack-the-Ripper hadn't been around. Fur-
thermore, there hadn't even been a devastating cross-examination of an
Oscar Wilde, and Sherlock Holmes had little use for the needle to
sharpen his wits.
Then upon the scene of this deplorable morality came, or rather
waddled, the delightful personage with a name as English as Smith-
his was Adams, Dr. Adams, if you will. And Dr. Adams was a poisoner,
at least it was so charged, and better still, not of one, but of many de-
lightful old ladies, his patients.
This case seemed to have everything delightful: Rotund, cherubic Dr.
Adams was as harmless, as learned, as downright benign in appearance
as any defendant I have ever had in this country in a civil medical mal-
practice case, dressed in all the aura of righteousness, figuratively and ac-
tually, that his adept counsel and Lloyd's of London, his liability carrier,
could afford him! Came the trial. It was almost a national holiday. The
Attorney General arose to state that he intended to prove "beyond reason-
able doubt and to moral certainty" that defendant Adams had planned,
schemed and designed to achieve his testamentary adequate award
not by blackboard and demonstrative evidence, but by the pill bottlel
But, because there was no pre-trial procedure beforehand in this case,
"justice prevailed," if we may use this expression rather loosely in this
instance. The prisoner was discharged instead of "being done in" and
every Englishman was satisfied.
What happened? Well, after the Attorney General had set his case
through the testimony of several nurses, England's now hero, the defense
barrister, produced the nurses' record books "lost" up until then, and
proceeded devastatingly to cross-examine the nurses from their own
hand-written entries and to destroy Regina's case.
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Now, of course, had there been a pre-trial, plaintiff's counsel would
have demanded these record books, they would have had to have been
produced or been inadmissible at trial, Dr. Adams might have been con-
victed and the whole upsurge of British morale dampened, quashed and
definitely detoured.
So, apparently the Englishman wants his trials and his advocacy that
way. He still wants his surprises in court. But the layman and the
lawyer in this country would now say such "surprise advocacy" will no
longer be available with adequate pre-trial!
Pre-Trial--Not Control
Pre-trial should not be a usurped power to "control" the lawsuit, from
its inception. Used as intended, it has no deleterious effects upon ad-
vocacy. But to illustrate what it is not: two weeks ago, I tried a case
in a federal court. My libellant, a 40-year-old sea captain, was pro-
nounced by the United States Marine Hospital as a traumatic epileptic.
There was no question of the findings by electric encephalographic re-
ports, by this independent institution of medicine, not retained or hired
by plaintiff. Libellant was earning $1,100 a month at the time of the
accident. He has a wife and four children, his special damages up to the
time of the trial were over $20,000. He will never be able to go to
sea again. He will not be free from convulsive seizures. A ventilator
plate cover had fallen upon his head in Trinidad, Port of Spain, and
in their own report filed with their own underwriters, defendants had
acknowledged that the cause of the accident was the negligent securing
of the cover by a longshoreman. Under the cases in the circuit in which
this case was tried, a longshoreman's negligence is imputable to the owner
of the vessel and, of course, an officer is a "sailor" within the meaning
of the Jones Act. He does not assume to be responsible for his fellow
servants' negligence.
During the course of the trial, the defendant offered $75,000 in settle-
ment. There had been no pre-trial conference nor settlement conference
and the trial judge et mero motu, during the course of the trial, said,
"We'll pre-try this after the evidence is in"!
At this trial judge's request, after the evidence had closed, counsel for
the respective parties, gathered in the judge's chambers and, by consent
of both counsel, I advised the court of the offer of $75,000, and of my
demand of $95,000 contingent upon an additional offer of shore-side
employment. The trial judge thereupon gratuitously commented that
the case was "a very close one." Counsel for defendant thereupon re-
duced his offer to $65,000.
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The case proceeded to argument. I placed upon the blackboard a
formula for the jury's use showing actual loss of wages, life expectancy,
what libellant would have earned had he not had the epilepsy and in-
dicated a figure of $500,000 which reduced to present value, with all
exigencies and deductions, came to $300,000. The important point is
that I showed the formula in the opening argument and fully discussed
the damages of this most responsible and seriously injured plaintiff (he
had been number one in a competitive examination of 4,000 Filipinos for
their National Nautical School and led his class for four years. His
record with his steamship company was outstanding).
On his instructions to the jury, the trial judge began by stating,
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this is not a 'giveaway court' or a
'share the wealth program.' The figures put on the board by counsel are
fantastic and utterly unreasonable"!
On the question of liability, continued the judge to the jury: "You
may have considerable difficulty in determining liability as this is a
close case."
There were other parts of the charge to which I, as graciously and as
respectfully as I could, took exception. But I submit to you respect-
fully and without transgressing your hospitality or my specific part in
this program that it is such procedures which do violence to advocacy.
This same federal judge had been so rude to the independent medical
expert retained by the United States Marine Hospital and whom I
called, a diplomate in psychiatry, a diplomate in neurology, and also a
diplomate in electroencephalography, that I apologized, most embar-
rassed, to the doctor afterwards.
I enjoy, even revere, a "rugged personality" upon the bench, state or
federal. I consider myself a person of rather individual tastes. But I
also know, I hope, when my individualism is about to turn to outright
bad manner, to uncalled for arbitrariness. Such deliberate attempts to
avoid advocacy drive us from our federal courts even though we know
there is only one such judge in an entire district who so judiciously as-
sassinates plaintiff's causes.
I mention the above procedure to you because if there is, in pre-trial,
any authority for such comments, or for such judicial conduct, then I
would want it vehemently and emphatically known that I do not sub-
scribe to pre-trial, that I do believe it would be the termination of ad-
vocacy, that it would be the destruction of everything we must today so
zealously guard while making haste slowly to modernize our trial prac-
tices for the consideration of him who is, most important, our client.
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LAW VS. MEDICINE
Sometimes I become discouraged with my practice of the law. I
chose between medicine and law. Though you might not believe me after
listening to me cross-examine some doctor, I come from a family of
doctors. My grandmother was the first woman druggist in California.
Daily, as we read our newspapers, do we see of new feats of science,
of medicine. This disease has been conquered, that new surgical pro-
cedure has healed the innermost viscera of man. This new wonder drug
not only heals the body, but tranquilizes the mind as well. Surgical de-
vices one can see and feel, alleviate suffering. The results are tangible,
are visible. There was sickness, the modern doctor has come, now there
is health.
In his test tubes, the modern man of medicine has gone to and per-
haps even beyond the frontiers. Sometimes we think he may have gone
too far. But what he is doing is readily visible for all to see, no academic
results here.
How with the law? We still deal in words, in abstractions. We still
have our pleadings and we still maintain our now claimed most in-
adequate and unscientific jury. In defense, we say, its virtue is in its lack
of expertness, its lack of science.
We argue that there must be a part of man not material and we point
to the minister and the priest. We urge the philosopher's studies and
even the astronomer's as being practical.
But the layman is not satisfied, and some of that contagion of im-
patience has contaminated us as lawyers and judges. "Let us have pro-
cedures that get results one can see," we exclaim. "Let us junk the old
and try the new: we can always go back; why not experiment ahead;
only human beings and their rights are involved, only the Constitution
prevents us"!
I see the two professions sharply diverging: medicine may not be a
science and, indeed, in the malpractice case it's called "an inexact
science," but law-law certainly cannot even make claim of being a
"science." We cannot categorize man's conduct. Our standard bearer,
the "ordinarily prudent person," is as chameleonic as is one individual
from another. On occasion, he is a child. At other times, he is an adult
blind person. He may even be an intoxicated man, a woman of virtue,
he may be a doctor, a scientist. We cannot deposit a coin in a clerk's
office and assure a client with an identical injury, identical liability,
identical judge and identical advocate that he will get the identical




Perhaps the very difference between the professions, though they both
deal in human nature, is that one deals with ascertainable commodities
-temperature, pain, sickness, if you will, the other with the intangibles
-happiness, sorrow, desire, greed, jealousy, avarice, ambition, the mix-
tures in any lawsuit. This is the key to the solution we seek.
We ultimately in the law deal with a human being, an individual. He
is not to be categorized, labelled and placed neatly upon a shelf, i.e.,
you are negligent, 10%; you are contributorily negligent, 5%o; you have
last clear chance, 80%; you have assumption of risk, 2Y 2%. We realize
that some of our reforms, so-called, are better suited for a "science"
or something "mechanical" rather than one as individual as the human
being, his personality, his individuality.
We cannot completely do to law what is being done to modem medi-
cine, even with pre-trials, the impartial medical examiner, legislating
lawyers' fees, extra sessions and extra judges, working through the
summer.
I have but to tell you the story of a settlement to illustrate that human
nature is, and always will be, part of a lawsuit-and a lawsuit is an at-
tempt in retrospect to evaluate and perhaps compensate for an act of
past life. The late Jim Landy of Portland, Oregon, told me of a client
for whom he had negotiated what he felt was an excellent settlement
offer of $10,000 against his complaint prayer of $20,000. Jim reported
the $10,000 offer to his client. But his client was indignant. Said he,
"I had a dream last night and the Lord appeared and told me to hold out
for $20,000"! So Jim could do nothing but reluctantly proceed to trial.
He did, and suffered the embarrassment that sometimes comes to all of
us for trying too hard. The jury returned a verdict for $18,000, $8,000
above defendant's offer!
Jim somewhat sheepishly, but with joy, pumped his client's arm with
the congratulatory, "We were certainly lucky." Responded the client
with dead-pan face, "Lucky nothing. You cost me $2,000. If you hadn't
doubted Him, we'd have gotten the whole $20,000"!
Some years ago, a plaintiff personal injury lawyer tried his case, if
possible, in the state court and to a jury purposely selected by him with
two thoughts in mind: 1) least intelligent, 2) least economic standing.
That has changed. The modern trial lawyer prefers federal to the
state court, first because the dignity and solemnity of the federal court
lends itself to a more realistic award in the personal injury case. Sec-
ondly, in keeping with this, the modern trial lawyer deliberately selects
on his jury some bankers, some insurance men, some executives, but
definitely people of intelligence and financial understanding. His theory:
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if my case is sound in law and in damages, then I need an intelligent
jury that appreciates the valfie of the dollar to give me an award con-
sonant with the damages. He further reasons, "A person having no
money and less intelligence serving as a juror might return a 'sympathy'
verdict for my client, but knowledge of economic values and law might
require a $200,000 verdict as compared with the sympathy of a $50,000
verdict which the other juror thought he would bring back as a favor
to me" !
Another reason, of course, why the modern trial lawyer seeks the
forum of the federal courts is the federal rules of discovery. These truly
are the greatest boon to modern advocacy. They enable the modem
advocate to ferret out the facts rather than to guess at them on trial.
They enable one to "count the horse's teeth" rather than guess at them
as did the ancients in argument.
In one sense, pre-trial is an extension of the discovery procedures that
prevent the lawsuit from being a game of chance.
CONCLUSION
Thus, I urge that adequate pre-trial can accord in search of the ade-
quate award, an adequate judgment. I urge that adequate pre-trial can
do much to restore the true art of advocacy without the necessity of
technical encumbrances that have caused laymen to disregard the law in
favor of other judgments and to disrespect the art of the advocate.
Further, I urge that little pre-trial is worse than no pre-trial, and that
adequate pre-trial can help toward restoring respect to the lawyer and
his law by giving speedy justice with unclogged calendars.
But further would I suggest that which has not been considered here
at all today, or on the agenda, to my knowledge, that we go all the way
in our pre-trials, and like the Englishman, have "pre-appeals" as well.
Our client is not satisfied with the explanation that of his six years' delay
from trauma to payment of the adequate award, only three are in the
trial court, and these three years may be shortened by adequate pre-trial.
He asks: "How about those other three years?"-the sitting out of the
appeal. "I don't care what you call it, a hungry year is a hungry year
to me, and my family, whether the delay is in the appellate court or the
trial court. I cannot take dignity of a case on appeal as credit to the
corner grocery."
The Englishman with his speedy trial immediately determines upon a
speedy appeal, by having a procedure which preliminarily determines
whether the case is an appealable one, and this is accomplished within
weeks after judgment upon the verdict. I have sat in the Royal Courts
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to hear the appellate judges go over fifteen or twenty cases on "the right
to appeal" in a single day. Those appeals brought for delay and solely
for the purpose of bringing plaintiff to his knees are summarily disposed
of. I suggest and urge the consideration of such a pre-appeal procedure
along with our pre-trial procedure, fully to restore the faith of our client
in adequate justice that is timely returned.
But a warning from Blackstone about all precipitous legal reforms and
I shall be done. Though written years ago, it speaks of current legal
problems:
... the liberties of England cannot but subsist so long as this palladium
[jury trial] remains sacred and inviolate; not only from all open attacks
[which none will be so hardy as to make], but also from all secret machina-
tions, which sap and undermine it; by introducing new and arbitrary
methods of trial; by justices of the peace, commissioners of the revenue,
and courts of conscience. And however convenient these may appear at
first [as doubtless all arbitrary powers, well executed, are the most con-
venient], yet let it be again remembered, that delays and little incon-
veniences in the forms of justice, are the price that all free nations must
pay for their liberty in more substantial matters; that these inroads upon
this sacred bulwark of the nation are fundamentally opposite to the spirit
of our constitution; and that, though begun in trifles, the precedent may
gradually increase and spread, to the utter disuse of juries in questions of
the most momentous concern.
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